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Introductory Overview 
 
Peru is a major South American country replete with contradictions and anomalies, 
past and present. The highly developed, heavily populated, and well organized Inca 
Empire, with its capital in the Peruvian Andean highlands city of Cuzco and with control 
of what is present-day Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, southern Colombia, northern Chile, and 
northwestern Argentina, collapsed in weeks after the arrival of a small band of Spanish 
conquistadors. With the coastal city of Lima the Spanish Empire’s administrative center 
for all of South America for more than two hundred years, until the Bourbon reforms of 
the 1760s, Peru was favored over the rest of the region by the concentration of the 
Crown’s human and material resources. 
Perhaps due in part to Peru’s privileged position within the Empire, independence 
came late, in the early 1820s, and reluctantly, achieved largely through military forces 
and leaders from the South American colonial periphery of Argentina and Venezuela. The 
same explanation might also apply to some degree to the late arrival in Peru of the first 
wave of democracy, limited as it was, that was gradually spreading through Latin 
America from the 1850s onward. Only in the mid-1890s, after a succession of military 
heads of state and a devastating loss in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) against Chile 
that contributed to further political instability as well as virtually complete economic 
collapse, was limited liberal democracy established in Peru. 
Though lasting only about two decades (1895-1919, with a brief coup in 1914), it 
represents to this day Peru’s only extended experience with civilian elected rule. Augusto 
Leguía, the last of the elected presidents in this period, carried out a “self-coup” in 1919 
to rule as a civilian dictator for the next eleven years. From the 1930s through the 1970s, 
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any return to democracy more than briefly was thwarted by a deep animosity between the 
military and the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular 
Revolutionary Alliance, or APRA), a well organized and ideological but non-Communist 
party of the left.2 
By the 1960s, in an ironic twist, the progressively stronger and more 
institutionalized armed forces took upon itself as its core national security strategy the 
banner of reform once espoused by its arch-enemy. When the military-supported elected 
government of Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1963-1968) and his Acción Popular (Popular 
Action or AP) party stumbled in its efforts to effect change, the armed forces took over 
once again, this time with a comprehensive plan, largely borrowed from APRA, to 
transform Peru through major social, economic, and political reform. 3  Although the 
twelve-year military regime (1968-1980) was ultimately unsuccessful for a variety of 
reasons, most importantly because they attempted too much with too few resources, they 
were still able to bring about a number of important changes. One was to open up 
political space for the mostly Marxist left, which the military favored as an alternative to 
APRA, to organize and grow into a major political force. 4 
By the time the military government, battered, bruised, and chastened by its 
experience with long-term institutionalized rule, agreed to turn power back to the 
civilians between 1978 and 1980, the multiple parties of the left were major political 
players, particularly in unions and universities. With Peru’s first presidential elections in 
seventeen years in 1980, also the first ever in which all citizens 18 years of age or older 
could vote, the historical political landscape was dramatically changed. It is into this 
unlikely political context that the radical Maoist guerrillas of Shining Path (formally 
known as the Partido Comunista del Perú – Sendero Luminoso – PCP-SL, Communist 
Party of Peru – Shining Path) were also to emerge. 5 
As we know, social revolutions usually arise in a context of political polarization, 
repression, authoritarian rule, and economic crisis. Each of the five successful 
revolutions in Latin America occurred under such conditions (Haiti 1794-1804, Mexico 
1910-1917; Bolivia 1952; Cuba 1953-1959; and Nicaragua 1974-1979). Peru’s “people’s 
war” (1980-1995), though ultimately unsuccessful, began and developed under quite 
different circumstances. Shining Path launched its first revolutionary operations in May 
1980, at the very moment that Peru was establishing the most open democracy in its long 
and often turbulent political history. 6 
The theory of revolution would predict the early demise of such a quixotic 
initiative.7 A decade later, however, Peru’s democratic government was on the verge of 
collapse. Political violence had become generalized, the government’s responses 
ineffective and counterproductive, and the economy in shambles. Over the first ten years 
of the radical Maoists’ people’s war, more than 20,000 Peruvians had been killed, $10 
                                                 
2 Carol Graham, Peru’s APRA: Parties, Politics, and the Elusive Quest fo r Democracy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1992), 23-35. 
3 Graham, Peru’s APRA, 37-39. 
4 Philip Mauceri, State Under Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru (Boulder: Westview, 1996), 21-25. 
5 Gustavo Gorriti Ellenbogen, Sendero: La historia de la guerra milenaria en el Perú  (Lima: Editorial Apoyo, 
1990). 
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billion of infrastructure damaged or destroyed, some 500,000 internal refugees generated 
along with an almost equal number of emigrants, with a decline in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of 30 percent and a cumulative inflation of over two million percent.8 By 
1990, then, such discouraging indicators suggested that a Shining Path victory could be 
close at hand. 
 
 
Why Revolution under Democracy? 
 
How can we explain such a confounding set of developments? Several forces and 
factors were in play. One set of explanations relates to the origins, characteristics, and 
dynamics of Shining Path itself; another set, to those of the policies and mindset of 
various Peruvian governments from the 1960s through the 1980s. 
 
Factors Relating to Shining Path 
 
One important element is that the group that eventually became known as Shining 
Path began and took root in the early 1960s largely out of public view – in a remote and 
isolated department (state) of highland Peru, Ayacucho. While a very important region 
historically, since the final major battle securing Latin America’s independence from 
Spain was fought here in 1824, there had been only sporadic and limited central 
government attention to the area for many years. As late as the 1970s, there were no 
paved roads in the department, only one single lane dirt highway connecting the city of 
Ayacucho to the capital city of Lima, no telephones, sporadic electricity limited to three 
or four urban centers, with a single radio station and one weekly newspaper. In addition, 
both the Belaúnde government and the military regime that followed tolerated Marxist 
groups among students and in teachers’ and labor unions. While there were occasional 
police round ups of militant student and union leaders in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
including in Ayacucho, they were soon released. As a result, the group and its leadership 
could operate and expand over seventeen years before the declaration of the peoples’ war 
in 1980 almost unperceived by the outside world.9 
Secondly, the original ancestor of this radic al Maoist group organized initially at 
the National University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga (UNSCH) in this department’s 
capital. While the university dated from the 1670s, it had been closed for almost eighty 
years before being refounded in 1959 with a mission then unique to Peruvian institutions 
of higher education – the promotion of development in the region.10 The government also 
provided the resources necessary to pursue that mission. This meant that the university 
provided an opportunity unmatched in the country at that time for faculty and students to 
pursue either development or political agendas in the field. 
                                                 
8 David Scott Palmer, “Peru’s Persistent Problems,” Current History  89:543, January 1990, 6-7. The casualty 
figures cited here have been revised sharply upward by Peru’s Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission) in its 2003 report, noted below in footnote 52. 
9  Carlos Iván Degregori, Ayacucho 1969-1979: El surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso  (Lima: Instituto de  
Estudios Peruanos, 1990). 
10  Fernando Romero Pintado, “New Design for an Old University: San Cristóbal de Huamanga,” Américas, 
December 1961, np. 
 
 
PALMER: TERROR IN THE NAME  OF MAO IN PERU  91 
 
  
Thirdly, the opportunity to carry out such a mission attracted a number of Peru’s 
best scholars, as well as a few with more of a political than an academic agenda. Among 
the latter was the young Communist Party militant Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, later to 
become the head of Shining Path. Within a few months of his arrival in 1962, through his 
unshakable convictions and force of personality, he revitalized the almost moribund local 
party organization and established his presence in the still small university (about 400 
students and 40 faculty) as a committed and charismatic professor of the left. Over the 
next few years, he built from the ground up a Communist student association, and led 
these vanguard student elements as well as faculty counterparts to victory in university 
elections in 1968. The UNSCH then served even more than before as forum, incubator, 
and launching platform for the expansion of Guzmán’s radical organization and 
ideology. 11 
Fourth, given the extreme poverty and the almost entirely rural indigenous peasant-
dominated nature of Ayacucho that provided the external context within which the 
UNSCH operated, it is no surprise that Guzmán sided with China after the Sino-Soviet 
split of 1963-64. With this new ideological commitment, he worked diligently and 
successfully to build a strong Maoist party both within the university and in the 
countryside. As a professor in the university’s education program and director of its 
training school for several years in the 1960s, Guzmán prepared and in many cases 
radicalized a generation of teachers that took up positions in Ayacucho’s rural 
communities. These teachers – often from the countryside, with Spanish as their second 
language, and the first generation to get a university education – in many cases became 
the proselytizing front line of their mentor’s political organization.12 
A fifth important factor revolved around Guzmán’s relationship with the Chinese. 
He and his principal lieutenants made several extended trips to China between 1969 and 
1975 in the midst of the Cultural Revolution. Over these years, they became adherents of 
the most radical faction in that struggle, the Gang of Four. When their Chinese mentors 
lost out to their more moderate adversaries in the struggle for political control in China in 
1976, the Communist Party of Peru – Shining Path (PCP-SL) was cast adrift and forced 
to fend for itself. Totally radicalized by his Chinese experience, and convinced that the 
world Communist revolution was lost unless it could be purified and returned to its 
original Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideals, Guzmán concluded that only a properly directed 
people’s war in Peru could bring this about.13 
A sixth element was voluntarism. Even though the so-called objective conditions 
for the armed struggle did not exist in early 1980, as Peru prepared for the return to 
democracy with great enthusiasm and popular support, Guzmán concluded that Lenin’s 
voluntarist dictum could be appropriately applied. By launching the people’s war at this 
moment, he believed, its actions would sow disquiet, chaos, and indiscriminately 
repressive government responses, thereby creating over time the more favorable objective 
conditions required for continuing and expanding the revolution.14  
A seventh factor concerned how Shining Path could find the resources necessary to 
carry out its peoples’ war, since the organization had no international patrons after 1976 
                                                 
11 Gustavo Gorriti, “Shining Path’s Stalin and Trotsky,” in Palmer, ed. Shining Path of Peru , 167-177. 
12 Degregori, Ayacucho 1969-1979, 41-47. 
13 Gustavo Gorriti Ellenbogen, Sendero . 
14 Peter Flindell Klarén, Peru: Society and Nationhood in the Andes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
369-370. 
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in its quest for power through revolution. Although the group was formally affiliated with 
the Revolutionary International Movement (RIM), this relationship was dictated by the 
ideological imperative to be connected to a world-wide Communist movement, and 
involved little if any financial support. In the first years, Shining Path secured guns, 
ammunition, and dynamite through raids on isolated police stations and the hundreds of 
small mines that dot the slopes of the highlands. As the movement gathered strength, its 
needs increased correspondingly. 15 
By the mid-1980s, it had found a new source of both local support and significant 
funding in the coca producers and the drug trafficking of the Upper Huallaga Valley in 
north central Peru. Although it had to compete there at first with its smaller and less 
radical guerrilla rival, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), 16  Shining 
Path soon achieved a dominant position in the valley. By the late 1980s it is estimated 
that the guerrillas were extracting at least ten million dollars a year from the “taxes” paid 
by the Colombian operators of the small planes that operated out of over one hundred 
clandestine airstrips in the Upper Huallaga. 17 
Shining Path was able to set up a finance committee to distribute the funds to the 
organization’s central and regional committees to buy weapons, bribe local officials, and 
pay cadre regular stipends. The guerrillas were also able to enlist the support of many of 
the local associations of coca growers by forcing buyers to pay higher prices for their 
production. So Shining Path, having decided to go it alone, was in no way dependent on 
the always uncertain outside sources of financial and material support or the dictates of 
others but was able to garner substantial internal resources to finance its operations and 
to maintain its autonomy. 18 
 
Factors Related to the Government 
 
Aiding the PCP-SL in its quest, however unintentionally, were the failed efforts by 
the reformist military government in Peru in the late 1960s and 1970s to effect major 
change in economic and political organization during its tenure, particularly a profound 
agrarian reform. This reform was based on the principle of integrating large private 
estates with small peasant parcels to create new wealth through increased production. The 
model applied, however, was not well suited to the community-based agriculture of most 
of the highlands, and particularly so to Ayacucho, the center of most PCP-SL activities, 
where only a very few productive private agricultural properties operated. Its successful 
implementation actually further degraded the already precarious position of most 
                                                 
15 Simon Strong, Sendero Luminoso: El movimiento subversivo más letal del mundo (Lima: Peru Reporting, 
1992), 106. 
16 For a comprehensive overview of the MRTA, see Gordon H. McCormick, Sharp Dressed Men: Peru’s Tupac 
Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993). It should be noted, however, that the MRTA was 
responsible for only a small proportion of incidents of political violence (less than 3 percent), and even fewer of 
the deaths attributed to guerrilla activity in Peru through the early 1990s (less than 1 percent). 
17 José E.Gonzales, “Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley,” in Palmer, ed. Shining Path of Peru ,  
123-144. 
18 Gabriela Tarazona Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism . Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington Papers 144 (New York: Praeger, 1990). 
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indigenous peasants, opening up opportunities for proselytizing and support that the 
radical Maoists could exploit.19 
Contributing to Shining Path’s ability to expand its operations, once it declared the 
people’s war in 1980, was a second consideration that affected the official response to the 
early activities of the Maoist guerrillas – the reluctance of the new democratic 
government to recognize the presence of an insurgency on its watch. President Belaúnde 
(1980-1985), who had been ousted by a military coup during his previous term of office 
in the 1960s, was so fearful of renewed military influence in his second administration 
that he downplayed the problem for over two years before committing Peru’s armed 
forces to a military response. Although he did order specialized police forces, the sinchis,  
into Ayacucho in 1981, their extraordinarily bad comportment forced the president to 
withdraw them within a few months. In addition, throughout his administration, he 
resisted calls to provide both military and economic support, thus ensuring that the 
government’s response focused almost exclusively on military actions.20 
The sinchis’ actions highlighted a signific ant third factor that was in play, the long 
history of misunderstanding and exploitation between the white and mestizo center, based 
in Lima, and the largely indigenous highland periphery in Peru.21 This contributed to a 
racist mind set among police and military that often produced, once they intervened in 
the largely indigenous countryside of Ayacucho and its environs, totally inappropriate 
responses that amounted to state terrorism. Such actions not only served to drive 
indigenous peasants into the arms of Shining Path, but also provided the insurgents with 
further justification for their armed struggle. 22 
With the historic electoral victory of APRA in the 1985 elections, President 
García’s initial policies suggested a shift in counterinsurgency strategy to include 
economic rather than exclusively military initiatives in the highlands. However, his 
misguided economic policies at the national level produced hyperinflation and a virtual 
economic implosion over the last half of his administration, forcing not only the 
abandonment of the highland strategy but also creating a serious erosion in both civil 
government and military institutional capacity. 23 
One result was a sharp decline in military and police morale, as defense budgets 
were cut by more than fifty percent in the late 1980s and hyperinflation reduced salaries 
to less than ten percent of mid-1980s levels.24 Exacerbating the problem was the growing 
number of police and armed forces casualties at the hands of Shining Path – from 31 
police and one military in 1982 to 229 police and 109 military in 1989, or a total of 1,196 
deaths (795 police and 401 military) over the first ten years of the conflict.25  These 
developments provoked hundreds of resignations at both the officer and technical 
                                                 
19 David Scott Palmer, Revolution from Above: Military Government and Popular Participation in Peru, 1968-
1972 (Ithaca: Cornell University Latin American Studies Program, 1973), 230-237. 
20 Gen. Roberto C. Noel Moral, Ayacucho: Testimonio de un soldado (Lima: Publinor, 1989). 
21 Julio Cotler, “La mecánica de la dominación interna y del cambio social en el Perú,” Peru Problema (Lima: 
Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1969), 145-188.  
22  Carlos Tapia, Las Fuerzas Armadas y Sendero Luminoso: Dos estratégias y un final (Lima: Instituto de 
Estudios Peruanos, 1997), 27-43. 
23 Philip Mauceri, “Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and 
World Affairs, 33:4, Winter 1991, 100. 
24  David Scott Palmer, “National Security,” in Rex A. Hudson, ed. Peru: A Country Study. Area Handbook 
Series, 4 th Edition (Washington D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1993), 289, 292. 
25  Palmer, “The Revolutionary Terrorism of Peru’s Shining Path,” in Martha Crenshaw, ed. Terrorism in 
Context (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), Table 7.1, 271. 
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personnel levels across the armed and police services, and contributed to a decline in the 
armed forces’ readiness status from 75 percent in 1985 to 30 percent by 1990.26 
Such corrosive dynamics played out in the field in a loss of discipline, increased 
corruption, and, all too often, virtually complete operational ineffectiveness. With the 
U.S. government increasing its counter narcotics assistance to the police in this context 
of institutional erosion and extremely scarce resources, and as police felt it was bearing a 
disproportionate share of the counterinsurgency burden, tensions between the police and 
the military grew. They reached a flash point after the army failed in March 1989 to 
respond to urgent calls for help from a besieged police detachment in the Upper Huallaga 
town of Uchiza and allowed it to be slaughtered by Shining Path guerrillas.27 Although 
the García government undertook an organizational overhaul of the armed forces, police, 
and eight separate intelligence agencies by consolidating and renaming them, the lack of 
resources, both human and material, insured that no effective change would be 
immediately forthcoming. 
In summary, the insurgents were able to initiate and expand their people’s war 
through a combination of long preparation, charismatic leadership, a remote base, a 
radicalized ideology, and voluntarism. They were aided in their efforts by government 
inaction, a belated response, massive human rights violations, and economic crisis. This 
combination produced a set of conditions favorable for revolution that had not existed at 
the outset of the people’s war. The continuing ineffectiveness of elected civilian regimes, 
including misguided economic policies in the latter half of the 1980s that produced 
hyperinflation, economic crisis, and the virtual implosion of government, enabled the 
forces of Shining Path to make major advances toward their goal of revolutionary victory.  
 
 
Why Rebel Failure When on the Brink of Success? 
 
This set of considerations raises a second fundamental question. If Shining Path 
was poised for victory by the early 1990s, why did its revolution not succeed? Within 
five years, the revolutionaries were a spent force, dead, in jail, or rehabilitated, the 
remnants scattered and no longer a threat to the state. Part of the explanation has to do 
with ways in which Shining Path contributed to its own collapse and part, with major 
shifts in official strategies and policies. 
 
Rebel Mistakes 
 
One of Shining Path’s problems came to be overconfidence bordering on hubris. 
Although the organization’s leadership envisioned at the outset of its people’s war a long-
term revolutionary struggle, their successes against a government almost pathologically 
unwilling to mount effective responses gave rise to the belief that the regime was about 
to collapse and that they were on the brink of victory. Such overconfidence led the 
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27 Palmer, “National Security,” 300. 
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leadership to exercise less caution in their security and in tracking the rural support 
structures that had long provided their core cadre.28 
Another could be characterized as ideological myopia. While Shining Path’s radical 
Maoist ideology had been a potent unifying force for its supporters and helps explain 
how they could justify even their most barbaric acts, it simultaneously served to alienate 
most of the presumed beneficiaries of their revolution. The peasantry, initially attracted 
by the promise of a change in status, found cadre and local commissar alike so blinded by 
their convictions that they imposed on them a revolutionary organization that related 
neither to their heritage nor to their needs, and compounded the negative effects of their 
efforts by using terror and intimidation to maintain local “support.”29 
A third was the hydrocephalic nature of Shining Path’s organization. True, at its 
height, the guerrillas had a well-developed set of national, regional, and local 
organizations with corresponding central and regional committees to direct and 
coordinate. Ultimately, however, all power flowed from a single individual, President 
Gonzalo (Guzmán’s nom de guerre). He was the group’s founder, ideologist, strategist, 
and internal contradiction synthesizer, and explicitly fostered a “cult of personality” 
within the membership. All other leaders, from the Central Committee on down, were 
subordinate. As a result, Shining Path was particularly vulnerable as a guerrilla 
organization should he be killed or captured.30 
Fourth was Guzmán’s decision to initiate more systematic urban terrorism in the 
late 1980s, particularly in Lima, which, following Lenin, he justified as necessary in 
order to build support within the urban proletariat. Operations in the capital city sowed 
havoc and panic, but also brought the people’s war to the doorsteps of the political elite 
for the first time, contributing thereby to make them realize at last that the very survival 
of the nation was at stake. The terrorist actions in Lima strengthened the resolve of 
central government to find solutions. They also made the guerrillas more vulnerable to 
counterintelligence operations due to the intelligence services’ greater familiarity with 
these surroundings than in the highlands.31 
 
Government Successes 
 
Just as much of the explanation for the ability of Shining Path to advance its 
revolutionary project can be attributed to government errors over the decade of the 1980s, 
the guerrillas’ own mistakes contributed to its failure in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, it 
is unlikely that the Shining Path threat could have been overcome without a number of 
significant adjustments in the government’s approach to counterinsurgency as well. These 
                                                 
28 Carlos Iván Degregori, “After the Fall of Abimael Guzmán: The Limits of Sendero Luminoso,” in Maxwell A.  
Cameron and Philip Mauceri, eds. The Peruvian Labyrinth: Polity, Society, Economy (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 179-191. 
29  Carlos Iván Degregori, “Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in 
Ayacucho,” in Steve J. Stern, ed. Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1998), 131-140; Billy Jean Isbell, “Shining Path and Peasant Responses in Rural Ayacucho,” 
in Palmer, ed., Shining Path of Peru , 77-100; Tapia, Las Fuerzas Armadas y Sendero Luminoso , 103-104. 
30 See the revealing interview given by Guzmán to Luis Borje Arce and Janet Talavera Sánchez in El Diario , a 
sympathetic Lima weekly, which they titled, “La entrevista del siglo: El Presidente Gonzalo rompe el silencio,” 
July 24, 1988, 2-48. Also, the organizational structure and its vulnerabilities, in Benedicto Jiménez Bacca, 
Inicio, desarrollo, y ocaso del terrorismo en el Perú  (Lima: SANKI, 2000), Tomo 1.  
31 Tapia, Las Fuerzas Armadas y Sendero Luminoso , 133-152. 
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occurred over a period of several years in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when it 
appeared to many that Shining Path was gaining the upper hand in the conflict in a larger 
socio-economic context that was rapidly deteriorating as well. Taken separately, it is 
doubtful that any one of the changes made would have been sufficient; together, however, 
they combined over time to turn the tide in the government’s favor.  
 
A New Approach to Counterinsurgency 
 
One significant change was the top to bottom review by the military of its 
counterinsurgency strategy in 1988 and 1989. The initial result was the compilation of a 
comprehensive “Countersubversive Manual” that systematically analyzed the anti-
guerrilla campaign to that point and developed a new strategy that included the political, 
economic, and psychosocial aspects of counterinsurgency as well as the military 
components.32 This manual served as the guide for the progressive introduction of several 
major adjustments in the Peruvian armed forces’ approach to dealing with the now 
palpable threat of Shining Path. 
Beginning in 1990, the military began for the first time a “hearts and minds” civic 
action campaign in a number of the urban neighborhoods and communities that had been 
most susceptible to Shining Path influence, as well as strategically important to the 
guerrillas in many cases. The initiatives were modest, such as free haircuts and health 
clinics, whitewashing and re-roofing local schools, trash clean-up campaigns, soup 
kitchens, and building access roads or trails. Very quickly, however, local indifference, 
fear, or hostility towards the military turned to support. With carefully coordinated 
publicity for these initiatives, the media began to convey a more positive image of the 
military in newspapers and newsmagazines that reached a wider Peruvian audience that 
helped change public perceptions as well.33 
Another change was to begin to attach a soldier or two from the community or area 
to the unit conducting operations in that locality. The individuals involved knew the 
community, spoke the local language or dialect, and often could help the military unit 
communicate with the local population and gather much more accurate intelligence on 
Shining Path sympathizers and operations. Given the physical and human diversity of 
Peruvian neighborhoods and rural communities, particularly in the highlands, one would 
have expected such procedures to be a component of military counterinsurgency strategy 
from the outset. 
The reluctance for so long by the military to use personnel who were native to the 
areas of operations stemmed from a deeply held view in a highly centralized political 
system that such individuals would be likely to have a greater allegiance to their friends 
and relatives in the community than to the organization for which they worked. With the 
looming specter of failure and possible government collapse, however, the military 
changed its approach. Once again, the result was positive in many instances – better 
communication with the locals and the collection of intelligence on enemy plans, 
personnel, and operations that had heretofore not been available. 34 
                                                 
32 Tapia, Las Fuerzas Armadas y Sendero Luminoso , 43-55. 
33 Orin Starn, “Sendero, soldados y ronderos en el Mantaro,” Quehacer 74, noviembre -diciembre 1991, 64-65; 
Lewis Taylor, “La estratégia contrainsurgente: El PCP-SL y la guerra civil en el Perú, 1980-1996,” Debate 
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34 Palmer, Interviews with military personnel in Ayacucho, July -August, 1998. 
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The military also began by the early 1990s to be much more sensitive to the 
negative effects of indiscriminate operations and attacks on local populations. The army 
initiated training for its operational units so that they would carry out their missions in 
the neighborhoods or the countryside with fewer human rights violations and misguided 
attacks on non-combatants. As their counterinsurgency activities became more precisely 
targeted and less repressive, they began to gain the support of local populations. They 
also began to demonstrate the contrast between their approach and the increasingly 
violent and indiscriminate actions of Shining Path in its desperate attempts to retain local 
control through force and intimidation.35 
In another major shift in strategy and tactics drawn from the counterinsurgency 
review of 1988 and 1989, the Fujimori government persuaded congress to pass legislation 
that enabled the army to begin to formally support training and arming of local peasant 
organizations (rondas campesinas  or Civil Defense Committees) as a first line of defense 
against Shining Path attacks. Over many decades, when local highland communities 
found themselves threatened by cattle rustlers or attempts by neighboring communities to 
take some of their land by force and occupation, they would organize groups of 
community members into rondas to overcome the threat to their livelihood or well 
being.36 
Shining Path’s activities in the 1980s represented to many communities one more 
threat that had to be resisted. Although many decided to allow the guerrillas’ presence 
and control, thereby becoming communities of acceptance, many others organized rondas 
to fight them off, as communities of resistance. 37  Often, however, their primitive 
weapons of stones, slingshots, and sharpened sticks were no match for Shining Path’s 
superior arms. Even so, for years the military resisted any initiative to support the rondas 
in their efforts, out of fear that training and arms could be turned against them. The army 
also displayed the historic racism so prevalent in Peru that manifested itself in its lack of 
confidence in the ability of indigenous populations to use the assistance properly. 38 
Within a very short time after the army began its program of providing basic 
military training and an average of two or three rifles with a few bullets each for each 
ronda, their numbers and membership mushroomed. By 1993, there were more than 4,200 
rondas organized across the highlands, with a membership of almost 236,000.39 These 
Civil Defense Committees, as the army called them, became the first line of defense 
against Shining Path. Examples abound of their ability to fend off guerrilla attacks long 
enough to enable army units to arrive on the scene and rout the invaders. This decision 
may have been the single most important adjustment in the Peruvian government’s 
counterinsurgency strategy, as it gave some measure of increased capacity for resistance 
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to the local populations most affected by the guerrillas and who had the greatest stake in 
overcoming the threat.40 
Another significant change in the Peruvian government’s approach to the growing 
threat of Shining Path was the decision in late 1989 by the APRA administration’s 
Minister of the Interior, Augustín Mantilla, to create a small, autonomous police 
intelligence unit, the Grupo Especial de Inteligencia (Special Intelligence Group, or 
GEIN) with the sole mission of tracking the Shining Path leadership. After a shaky 
beginning, with only five members and outdated equipment, the unit was provided with 
resources and skilled personnel, increasing to about 35 by 1990 and 50 a year later. 41 The 
group was subject to intense political pressure in the waning weeks of the discredited 
García government as the APRA leadership looked for some spectacular event to restore 
popular support. As a result, even though its intelligence was incomplete, it felt forced to 
conduct a raid on a suspected Shining Path safe house in Lima that might harbor Guzmán, 
a raid that confirmed his location, but missed the leader.  
Even though the new elected government of President Fujimori could have been 
expected to terminate the previous administration’s intelligence initiative as part of a 
complete policy overhaul, after his July 1990 inauguration he left GEIN in place. With 
virtually complete autonomy and with additional resources and personnel, the 
intelligence group slowly advanced in its ability to identify and follow the guerrilla 
leadership. Over the course of 1991, GEIN operatives were able to capture Shining Path’s 
master files and round up some second-level leaders, even as the guerrillas were carrying 
out ever more brazen and violent terrorist acts. The culmination of GEIN’s efforts 
occurred on September 12, 1992, when some 35 of their members burst into a safe house 
in a Lima suburb and captured a startled and security escort- less Guzmán, along with 
several other members of the PCP-SL Central Committee. 42 
With this success, soon to be followed by the round up of several hundred other 
militants and cadre, the government delivered a mortal psychological and tactical blow to 
the Shining Path. The Fujimori government milked the moment to its full extent by 
publicly displaying Guzmán to the media in a cage especially constructed for the 
occasion, and then quickly tried him in a military court under new procedures which kept 
the identities of the judges hidden. Predictably, the court sentenced him to life 
imprisonment.43 
Although violent incidents declined by less than ten percent over the six months 
following Guzmán’s capture and then increased by some fifteen percent during the first 
seven months of 1993, these proved to be the last gasps of a dying movement.44 By the 
end of 1994, Shining Path, while still a nuisance in some parts of the country, had ceased 
to pose a threat to the Peruvian state. Because of the over concentration of the 
organization’s power in a single individual, Shining Path could not long survive his 
capture. The intelligence unit received the one million dollar reward the government had 
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offered for getting Guzmán, and its members were lionized in the press – with good 
reason. 
The Fujimori government also undertook two other important initiatives to assist it 
in its efforts to gain the upper hand over the Shining Path. One was the establishment 
shortly after the April 1992 autogolpe of a military and civilian court procedure of 
“faceless” judges to try captured guerrillas to ensure rapid trials and protection from 
reprisals. One of the major problems governments had had to this point was the long 
delay in bringing those prisoners accused of subversion to court, with time awaiting trial 
in jail averaging over seven years. Another was the systematic intimidation and even 
assassination of judges assigned to oversee the trials, which had both a chilling effect on 
their willingness to convict and a tendency for them to find legal excuses to release 
convicted terrorists from prison.45 
This was a controversial initiative from the outset because of the courts’ short-
circuiting of due process (it was subsequently determined that several hundred 
convictions had been secured without legal justification). In fact in 1999, the Inter-
American Human Rights Court (IAHRC), of which Peru was a signatory, declared the 
faceless judge procedure to be an unconstitutional violation of due process. Though 
rejected at the time by the Fujimori government, its democratically elected successor 
accepted the IAHRC decision and is now in the process of setting up new trials for those 
convicted under the previous arrangement. The effect at the time, however, was to 
quickly overcome the backlog of pending cases as well as to quickly process new ones, 
thereby increasing a renewed sense of government effectiveness among the public as well 
as to make the public feel more secure.  
The other important initiative of the Peruvian government was the implementation 
in early 1993 of a “repentance law,” in effect until November 1994. It was designed to 
enable Shining Path cadre and sympathizers to turn themselves in with their weapons 
and/or information in exchange for support, retraining, and progressive reintegrat ion into 
society. During the period it was in effect, over 5,000 individuals availed themselves of 
this opportunity, although most were lower level supporters and sympathizers rather than 
regional or national leaders. Even so, the government gained additional intelligence in 
the process, and also offered an alternative to those who had chosen to support Shining 
Path. In the context of the capture of Guzmán and the clear shift in advantage to the 
government, the timing of the repentance law’s implementation was ideal, as it came 
when the incentive for those who had been involved with the guerrillas to turn 
themselves in had increased markedly. 46 
A final government initiative, not only a component of the new approach to 
counterinsurgency but also a response to the economic crisis that had gutted the 
traditional government bureaucracy and left millions of Peruvians in desperate poverty, 
was the creation of a new set of small government organizations to focus on small 
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development programs in areas of extreme poverty, mostly rural. Many of these were also 
centers of Shining Path activity. 47 
The new agencies were small (about 300 employees each nationwide), and the 
employees were highly trained specialists, often engineers, who were recruited on merit 
criteria, paid high salaries, and given significant regional autonomy. The agencies were 
also focused on a set of small development programs that would have significant impact 
at the local level, among them irrigation, potable water, reforestation and soil 
conservation, electrification, school building, and access trails or roads.48 
Most projects were $2,000 or less, with labor provided by the communities 
themselves and technical oversight by the agencies. In many, the requirement for 
beginning a program was for the community to decide what it most needed and to elect a 
small committee with responsibility for overseeing the project. Over the five years 
between 1993 and 1998, these agencies expended over one billion dollars on the array of 
programs and succeeded in reducing extreme poverty by one-half (from 31 percent to 15 
percent). These agencies and programs had a number of significant effects, not only in 
reducing extreme poverty in districts that had in many cases been affected by political 
violence, but also in demonstrating to local citizens that the government cared about them 
and was able to extend its reach once again to even the most isolated parts of Peru. They 
also helped to foster new local organizations that helped to recreate a measure of 
institutional capacity at the grass roots within civil society. 49 
 
Economic Recovery 
 
Peru’s economy was in a most precarious state when President Fujimori took office 
in July 1990. Hyperinflation was out of control at a 7,600 percent annual rate. The 
country had lost completely its access to international credit because the previous 
government failed to pay Peru’s foreign debt obligations for almost three years. 
Unemployment hovered at close to thirty percent. The GDP, down over twenty percent 
during the last two years of the García government, was in a free fall. Without immediate 
and drastic measures to turn the national economy around, it is quite unlikely that 
counterinsurgency initiatives alone could have stemmed the growing threat posed by 
Shining Path.50 
The new president, having been briefed after his election on the seriousness of the 
economic situation by advisors in Peru, Washington, and New York, turned his back on 
his campaign promises to take economic measures that would not be drastic or pose 
short-term hardship. Almost immediately after his inauguration, President Fujimori 
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instituted a drastic economic shock program to break the inflationary cycle by ending 
government subsidies and indiscriminate printing of currency, among other harsh 
measures. 
Peru also began within a few weeks to reinstate regular payments on the $15 billion 
foreign debt, and soon created a new domestic tax collection agency to boost government 
tax revenues, which had fallen to four percent of GDP. The government also reduced 
tariffs on exports and imports to foster production and reduce inflation and set up 
procedures for the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the opening up the 
national stock market to generate direct and portfolio foreign investment. State 
employees were encouraged to retire by providing significant but one-time financial 
incentives to reduce an official bureaucracy bloated by 40 percent during the APRA 
government, much through political patronage.  
The draconian measures instituted during Fujimori’s first months in office reversed 
the downward economic spiral within a year. Inflation was cut in half, domestic tax 
revenues increased, and the international economic community began to look again at 
restoring credit to Peru. By the second year, the cycle of hyperinflation was broken at last, 
government revenues and expenditures were almost in balance, and Peru was able to 
reinsert itself into the international economic system. By 1993, inflation had been 
reduced to 65 percent, employment increased, new foreign investment began, and 
positive economic growth was recorded for the first time in almost a decade. By 1994, 
Peru had the highest economic growth rate in Latin America, with inflation down to ten 
percent. 
President Fujimori also made full use of his office as a “bully pulpit” to help 
restore public confidence, with a frenetic schedule that took him all over Peru, 
particularly to the areas most affected by the insurgency and historically the least favored 
by central government. In spite of the multiple problems the country was facing and the 
strong medicine the administration was administering to try to overcome them, the 
president’s public approval ratings remained consistently high. The general perception 
was that at last Peru had a head of state who was taking action rather than playing 
politics and was thinking about the public interest rather than personal gain.51 
However dramatic the turnaround during these first years of the Fujimori 
administrations, the peoples’ war exacted a high cost for the country and its people. Over 
the fifteen year trajectory of Shining Path’s revolutionary terrorism and the government’s 
efforts to combat it, close to one million Peruvians, mostly humble highland peasants, 
were displaced from their homes and became internal refugees. Roughly an equal number 
emigrated, often the more skilled and educated, out of fear for their safety and despair of 
ever finding secure opportunities in their homeland. The dollar estimates of the total 
damage caused by Shining Path operations between 1980 and 1995 was over $15 billion 
to infrastructure and $10 billion in lost production, or about half of Peru’s 1990 GDP. The 
official estimates of about 35,000 deaths and disappearances has recently been revised by 
a careful study by Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, particularly in rural 
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areas most affected by the insurgency, which concludes that the correct number is about 
69,000, more than twice the earlier figure. 52 
Sadly, democracy was also a casualty, with President Fujimori’s self-coup 
(autogolpe) in 1992. While pressured to restore democratic forms a year later by the 
Organization of American States (OAS), following his 1995 reelection Fujimori and his 
advisors progressively constrained democratic procedures with a set of provisions of 
dubious legality. Though forced from office in a spectacular set of developments in 2000, 
shortly after his fraudulent re-reelection, the path to democratic reconstruction has been a 
difficult one. 53 
At this moment, President Alejandro Toledo, the hero of the resistance to Fujimori, 
who was elected in 2001, has lost most of his popular support by his vacillation and 
indecisiveness. Shining Path is showing new signs of life, with new recruitment efforts in 
universities and peasant communities, incidents of political violence, and utilization of a 
more transparent and human rights respecting government to renew contacts from prisons 
and seek new trials. In Ayacucho, for example, Shining Path members have established a 
working relationship with local organizations such as the Frente de Defensa de Ayacucho 
(The Ayacucho Defense Front) and the Federación de Cocaleros del Apurímac (The 
Apurimac Valley Coca Growers Federation). A violent attack on the Ayacucho city hall, 
local businesses, and the new Regional Government Office on July 1, 2004, has been 
blamed on Shining Path instigators.54 Even so, Shining Path no longer represents a threat 
to the Peruvian state or to most of the population. Whatever the continuing difficulties of 
Peru’s democracy, and they are many, it is unlikely that Shining Path will be in any 
position to exploit them for the foreseeable future.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Peru was eventually able to overcome the threat posed by the radical Maoist 
Shining Path, but at great human and institutional cost. Looking back, had the 
government taken the threat seriously during 1980-1981, the first year of the group’s self-
declared peoples’ war, it is likely it would have nipped the insurgency in the bud.55 The 
initial response was to withdraw from the more isolated police posts, which opened up 
additional space for Shining Path to build its popular support groups in the communities 
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and to strengthen its military capacity. When the government finally did begin to take the 
guerrillas seriously, it responded almost exclusively with military force, often 
indiscriminate. Field commanders who requested an economic development component 
to support their military activities were ignored or dismissed. 
Although the APRA government that came to power in the 1985 elections made 
some initial gestures to build alliances in the highlands, it soon succumbed to military 
pressures to pursue the same repressive strategy followed by its predecessor. Its 
economic policies, furthermore, produced hyperinflation, virtual fiscal bankruptcy of the 
bureaucracy, and the almost total loss of vital international financial and investment 
support. By the end of the 1980s, then, Peru faced not only generalized political violence 
but also its most serious economic crisis in over one hundred years. 
It was only when the government found itself against the wall that it took the 
insurgency problem seriously enough to review its approach and to make a number of 
changes between 1988 and 1992 that significantly increased its ability to deal more 
effectively with Shining Path’s advances. 
The most important were the creation of a specialized police intelligence unit to 
track the insurgent leadership, the complete overhaul of military counterinsurgency 
strategy and implementation of approaches designed to garner local support, and the 
decision to train and arm the community Civil Defense Committees, or rondas. Once 
these measures had enabled the government to regain the initiative, the repentance law 
that offered rehabilitation, retraining, and reinsertion into society of guerrilla 
sympathizers and militants became a critical instrument of pacification. 
Along with such specific and significant adjustments in the government’s approach 
to counterinsurgency, the Fujimori administration established of a set of new official 
agencies to carry out a range of small development programs in the poorest districts of 
Peru, often where Shining Path had a significant presence. These provided significant 
benefits in a short period of time to three to five million of the country’s most needy 
citizens, while simultaneously reestablishing the government’s presence and legitimacy 
in the periphery. With parallel efforts to repair the severely damaged national economy 
that ended inflation, generated economic growth, restored the fiscal capacity of the 
government, and reinserted Peru into the international economy within two to four years, 
the Fujimori administration was able to overcome the Shining Path threat. 
Unlike the government, the insurgents did not learn or adapt. From the outset, 
Shining Path pursued the single objective of overthrowing the regime through the 
peoples’ war. Negotiation was never an option. Convinced of the ideological correctness 
of its approach, which included the complete reorganization of civil society along Maoist 
lines, the Shining Path leaders tried to impose a model in its areas of operation that in no 
way reflected the traditions, patterns, and needs of those they said were to be the 
beneficiaries of their revolution. Their ideological fervor and their successes against the 
government for a number of years blinded them to the possibility that they could be 
defeated. While they often learned from failures in field operations and adjusted their 
military strategy accordingly, they did not do so in their relations with the civilian 
populations under their influence. But their greatest failure was to underestimate the 
capacity of government to learn from its own mistakes, which led to the single most 
important turning point in the insurgency, the capture of President Gonzalo. 
External actors, particularly the United States government, became sufficiently 
concerned about Shining Path’s advances against the beleaguered Peruvian democracy to 
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provide significant military and intelligence support in 1991 and 1992. With Fujimori’s 
self-coup in April 1992, however, military assistance and training was immediately 
suspended. However, the U.S. government did not end its specialized intelligence support 
at this time. It is believed that such support was crit ical in locating the safe house 
occupied by Guzmán, support that enabled the Peruvian police intelligence unit to 
conduct its successful raid and the Shining Path’s leader’s capture. 56  The conclusion 
Peruvian authorities had reached that the snaring of the head of the insurgent 
organization would be a devastating psychological and organizational blow turned out to 
be correct. In an organization where a single individual held most of the power, removing 
that person would be the group’s death knell. 
Beyond the physical and human destruction wrought by the insurgency and the 
government’s response, another casualty was Peru’s democracy. Although President 
Fujimori defended his self-coup as necessary to prevail against Shining Path, most 
observers conclude that success occurred in spite of the suspension of congress, the 
constitution, and the judiciary, not because of it. It is the case that the military, frustrated 
by the failures of the elected governments of the 1980s to stem the insurgency or to 
govern effectively, put together amidst the chaos of the last months of the García 
government a plan for gaining greater control over the process, the so-called Libro Verde, 
or Green Book. This plan envisioned much stronger executive control, a comprehensive 
counterinsurgency strategy as articulated in the Countersubversive Manual, and the 
implementation of free market principles to restore the economy.57 
With the election of Alberto Fujimori to the presidency in 1990, the military saw an 
opportunity to accomplish the Libro Verde objectives through civilian rule. Since 
Fujimori did not have a strong party apparatus to support him, the military became his 
major pillar of institutional support, and backed his decision to suspend constitutional 
government in April 1992. However, through patronage and careful cultivation of some 
top military officials, Fujimori and his close advisors, particularly Vlademiro Montesinos, 
and not the military itself became the controlling force in subsequent policy initiatives. 
While it is not clear that Fujimori planned a coup from the outset of his 
administration, he certainly had no patience for the give and take of democratic politics 
with the opposition majority in congress. On balance, the formal breakdown of 
democracy in Peru in 1992 can be attributed primarily to the corrosive forces of the 
people’s war and counterinsurgency that were at work over more than a decade, along 
with the multiple errors of elected civilian authority in other areas of governance, most 
particularly economic management. 
Shining Path initiated its people’s war at what appeared to be a most inopportune 
moment, on the eve of the most democratic elections in Peru’s history. However, the 
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guerrilla organization’s visionary leadership, ideological conviction, and voluntarist 
strategy combined to enable it to advance in the remote countryside when central 
government’s control was tenuous at best. As the government withdrew from less 
defensible positions, it created a political vacuum in the countryside that Shining Path 
quickly filled. Whether by accident or design, Guzmán and his followers found that 
central government lacked both the capacity and the commitment to respond effectively 
and that, when under growing pressure to do something, government reacted like the 
repressive and insensitive force that Shining Path’s radical Maoist ideology attributed to 
officialdom. This served to create a cycle of negative causation that progressively created 
the conditions of a weakened and vulnerable state in a climate of increasin gly generalized 
political violence. With the multiple errors of elected government in other arenas as well, 
especially in economic policy, the state’s capacity for effective governance was 
progressively eroded. 
Alberto Fujimori’s election was the public’s act of electoral desperation to choose 
someone not a career politician who might lead the country out of the morass in which it 
found itself. By its vote, the public in effect gave Fujimori the leeway to do whatever he 
thought necessary to overcome the profound and multifaceted malaise of the moment. 
This helps to explain both public support of the harsh economic measures that were most 
painful in the short term and its willingness to accept the autogolpe as a possible solution 
to the Shining Path threat, especially in the context of Peruvian judges’ release in early 
1992 of over 200 convicted guerrilla cadre “for good behavior.” 
Fujimori, without a party and with only the military to provide institutional support 
for his government, could not have acted without the armed forces’ blessing. But the 
overriding concern at the moment of the self-coup was how to counter the continued 
advance of Shining Path within severely weakened civilian institutions, intimidated 
officials, and discredited politicians. So on balance, whatever Fujimori’s antidemocratic 
tendencies, the primary force that motivated and justified the autogolpe can be attributed 
to public support as well as official perception of the imminent threat of a Shining Path 
victory in a larger context of frustration over Peruvian democracy’s multiple missteps and 
progressive delegitimization as a result. 
As subsequent events were to demonstrate, even after the threat of Shining Path 
had passed, the Fujimori government continued to manipulate the system to shut off 
dissent and to ensure that it would continue to run the country. So instead of receiving 
acclaim for the success of the counterinsurgency effort and for the significant 
improvement in the economic and personal security of much of the citizenry,  the former 
president continues to be pilloried for the abuses of power that he and his closest advisors 
committed while in office. 
Shining Path, while still a minor presence in a few isolated parts of the country, has 
divided into radical and moderate factions. Guzmán, soon to receive a new trial, has 
called for the end of the armed struggle for the nonce. So the once feared insurgent 
organization no longer represents a threat to the Peruvian state, or to most of the 
population. Democracy has been reestablished, though still fraught with problems and 
challenges. While Peru still faces many difficulties, terrorism in the name of Mao is no 
longer one of them. Nevertheless, the continuing fragility of democratic process and 
procedures, the erosion of confidence by most Peruvians in their government, and the 
inability of the Toledo administration to channel constructively almost constant local and 
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regional protest movements provide a context within which another insurgency, perhaps 
even one led by Shining Path, could again emerge.  
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